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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 20020171-CA

KORRY BARLOW SMEDLEY
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for four counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-404.1 (1999).

This Court has

jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(Supp. 2002).

?TATEMENT QF THE ISSVS QH APPEAL ANP
?TANPAPP OF APPELATE REVIEW
1.

Where defendant's objection to certain evidence at trial

focused wholly on its lack of relevance, did the trial court
abuse its discretion by not considering whether it might have
been inadmissible under other, unargued evidentiary rules?
Where an issue has not been specifically and properly
preserved for appellate review, it is waived.
review applies.

1

No standard of

2.

Did the trial court properly determine that defendant's

inquiry to an investigating detective, prior to any charges being
filed, about "what kind of a deal he could get if he pled guilty"
was admissible pursuant to rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence?
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
evidence is relevant.

The court commits reversible error in a

relevancy ruling only if it has abused its discretion.

State v.

Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSr STATUTES ANP RV1SS
Utah Rule of Evidence 401, defining relevant evidence,
provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence*
Utah Rule of Evidence 402, governing admissibility,
provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this
state* Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with four counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony (R. 1).
His first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury failed to
reach a unanimous verdict (R. 273: 279). After a second trial,
the jury found defendant guilty of four counts of sexual abuse of
a child (R. 278: 262). The court subsequently determined that
the crimes were aggravated by defendant's position of special
trust as an adult cohabitant of the victims' mother (Id. at 263).
The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 5 years to
life in the Utah State Prison on counts 1 and 2 and concurrent
terms of 5 years to life on counts 3 and 4, with the concurrent
terms running consecutive to each other (R. 240-42).

Defendant

filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 247).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Six weeks after Debra Baldwin met defendant, she and her
three daughters, ages 8, 6, and 5, moved into defendant's onebedroom apartment (R. 277: 93). Defendant and Debra slept in the
bedroom; the three girls shared a hide-a-bed in the living room
(Id. at 100). Defendant was employed as a painter, working a
flexible schedule; Debra was not employed (Id. at 97, 100, 108).
Defendant assumed the role of father in the girls' lives, playing
with them and taking them on errands, both individually and
together (Id. at 94-95).

This arrangement, although punctuated
3

by "kind of severe" arguments between Debra and defendant,
continued for nine months (Id. at 92-93, 95) .
Finally, after an especially severe argument in August of
2000, Debra decided that she "was tired of the abuse" and left
defendant's apartment with the three girls (Id. at 92, 95). They
walked to a nearby bus stop, where Debra calmed down, thought
about her financial dependence on defendant, and ultimately
decided to return to the apartment (Id. at 97, 107). When she
told her children, "[t]hey were frantic, they did not want to go
back" (Id. at 98).

Debra testified, "I asked them why and they

said, Because he's mean-, because he spanks us.
Well, don't you love him?

And I asked them,

And they said, No, no, no, we don't

want to go back home" (Id. at 102). At that juncture, Debra
testified, "I asked them if he was touching them on the private
[sic] and [the two older girls] said yes" (Id. at 98).
Debra did not return to defendant's apartment, nor did she
further question the girls (Id. at 103).

Instead, she went to

her sister's home for a few days, during which time she notified
the police.

She then moved with the girls to a shelter, where

they stayed for about a month (Id. at 106, 108).
Following Debra's call to the police, a detective with the
family violence unit interviewed the girls and then decided to
interview defendant (Id. at 165, 168). The detective described
the encounter with defendant as "just a basic conversation, this

4

is a sex abuse case,

you're listed as a suspect.

These girls

have said something about you, we want to talk to you about that
today, that's why we're here" (Id. at 170). l

Defendant responded

by "den[ying] that and then he wanted to know what - you know,
what kind of a deal he could get if he pled guilty, you know,
exactly what the penalty would be.
what would he get" (Id, at 170-71).

If he were to plead guilty,
He repeated this inquiry

"several times" (Id. at 171). When defendant made these
statements, the case was still in the investigation stage.
charges had been filed.

No

Indeed,^ the investigating officer

testified that no charges, penalty, or punishment had even been
mentioned.

(Id. at 171).

In response to his inquiries, defendant was told, "'We don't
make deals with people, that's not our job, that's not our position.

We want to talk about the case, we want to know, you

know, what happened.
(Id.).

We want to get his side of the story'"

Defendant then mentioned that "he didn't want the girls

to have to testify, but he just needed to know what kind of
penalties this would come with before he would, you know, talk to
us any further" (!£•. at 172).
At trial, the younger girl, who was 8 at the time, testified
that defendant was a "bad person" because "he touched me in the

1

Prior to the interview, defendant waived his Miranda
rights (R. 277: 168-69).
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wrong place'' (Id. at 114-15) .

Specifically, she testified that

he touched her on the "pee pee" and "bum" both at home and in his
red truck (Id. at 116, 117) .

She said that in the truck he kept

one hand on the steering wheel, while he "rubbed" her "pee pee"
over her clothes with the other (Id. at 120, 123). She also
described defendant making her touch his penis in the truck (Id.
at 118). She saw his penis "stuck through his zipper" (Id. at
119).

She testified that defendant made her rub lotion on it

from a small bottle he kept in the truck, that "[his penis] was
soft and then it got hard," and that she saw "white stuff" come
out of it (Id. at 121)>

When they were in the truck, he wiped

himself off with a napkin (Id.).

She further testified that at

home, he touched her under her clothes and that when she rubbed
his penis with lotion, the lotion came from a bigger bottle that
he kept in the bedroom (Id. at 123-24).

Afterwards^ he washed

himself off in the bathroom with water while she washed the
lotion off her hands (Id. at 121, 124).
The older girl, 10 years old by the time of trial, also
testified (Id. at 134). She described her relationship with
defendant as "kind of good, kind of bad" (Id. at 136) .

While she

testified that she called defendant "Dad" and went places with
him, she also reported that he rubbed her "pee pee" and "butt"
with his fingers "a lot" of times (Id^ at 136-37, 158). This
activity, lasting a "few minutes" each time, would occur both at
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home and in the truck; sometimes, but not always, her sisters
were present (Id. at 138) • In the truck, defendant would reach
over and rub her "private" (Id. at 140) . He would also have her
rub lotion on his penis, and he would sometimes buy her treats
afterwards (Id, at 140-41) . When ''white stuff" came out of
defendant's penis, he would wipe it off with a napkin from the
glove box (Id. at 141) . Defendant told her "a lot of times" not
to tell anyone "or else he'll go to jail and he'll get in big
trouble" (Id. at 139). She testified that she did not tell
anyone "[b]ecause i thought he would hurt me" (Id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
While defendant argues on appeal that his statement to the
investigating detective should have been excluded under rules
401, 402, 408, and 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, he failed
to present objections based on rules 408 and 410 to the trial
court.

Absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances,

neither of which he has asserted, those arguments cannot now be
considered for the first time on appeal.

They are waived.

Defendant's only preserved argument is that the evidence
should have been excluded because it lacked relevance. His
statement to the detective questioning what kind of a deal he
could get if he pled guilty, however, constitutes circumstantial
evidence of consciousness of guilt and is, therefore, relevant.
Even assuming for purposes of argument that the testimony
7

was not relevant, its admission did not harm defendant because,
even without it, the outcome of his trial would likely have been
the same.

Both young victims testified in graphic detail about

the abuse they experienced.

Further, the police detective who

interviewed the girls confirmed that their trial testimony was
consistent with what they had each told her when she originally
investigated the matter,
ARGUMENT
PQINT QNS
WHERE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE
SOLELY QN THE BASIS OF RELEVANCE,
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT NOW CONSIDER
FOR THE FIRST TIME WHETHER THE
EVIDENCE MIGHT HAVE BEEN
INADMISSIBLE UNDER OTHER, UNARGUED
EVIDENTIARY RULES
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by
admitting his inquiry to the detective about "what kind of a deal
he could get if he pled guilty" (Br. of Aplt. at 8 ) . 2 Defendant
2

Defendant asserts that the proper standard for reviewing
the admission of his statement to the investigating detective is
correction of error. See Br. of Aplt. at 1. For this
proposition, he relies on State v. Martin, a case stating that
when the prosecutor affirmatively presents evidence, the
defendant has a right as a matter of law to rebut that evidence.
State v. Martin. 2002 UT 34, 1 29, 44 P.3d 805. If a trial court
completely precludes defendant from rebutting the prosecution's
evidence, then the appellate court reviews that ruling for
correctness. Id. However, it a trial court makes an evidentiary
ruling based on a relevance objection, that objection is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g. , State v. Fedorowicz, 2002
UT 67, 1 32, 52 P.3d 1194 (articulating abuse of discretion
standard of review for relevance rulings).

8

grounds this argument on four independent bases - that admitting
the statement violated rules 401, 402, 408, and 410 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

See Br. of Aplt. at 8-9.

At trial, however, defendant objected to the admission of
the statement made to the investigating detective based only on
its relevance.3

Counsel argued:

Your Honor, you'd made a ruling [at the first
trial] that the State could go into a
statement that was made by my client. And
the statement was basically just that
Detective Rackley - and she did testify at
our last trial, that when they went to
interview him he asked her what kind of deal
he could get if he pled guilty. And I'm
renewing my objection that that come in
because it'3 irrelevant.
I have since talked with the other detective
that was there . . . and his recollection is
a little bit different. His recollection is
that at some point later on in the
conversation [defendant] suggested that he
thought he should talk to an attorney about
what he was looking at. . . And I realize
that that simply creates a factual question.
But I think it is a question that does go to,
again, the relevance of this. And that is,
when they're talking to him about a certain
charge to say they have a conversation with
the client who doesn't have an attorney there
and then for the client to ask, Well, what
kind of deal are you looking at offering me
3

For preservation of his argument, defendant not only
cites to his second trial, but also to his first trial, which
ended in a mistrial. See Br. of Aplt. at 2 (citing R. 272: 1828 6). However, "what happened by way of ruling on the
admissibility of evidence in the first trial, has nothing to do
with anything that eventuated at the second trial, which was a
trial anew, with no kinship whatever with the first case." State
v. Llovd, 662 P.2d 28, 28 (Utah 1983).
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is irrelevant to guilt in the case. . .
[T]hat's my objection, your honor.
(R. 277 at 79).
The law is well-settled that "[t]rial counsel must state
clearly and specifically all grounds for objection."
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993).

State v.

Absent such

objection, an issue is not preserved for appeal.

Id.

And, the

objection that is stated must "*be specific enough to give the
trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel [or
defendant] claims."

State v. Brvant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah

App. 1998)(quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d
457, 460 (Utah App. 1096)).
Hera, defendant stated "clearly and specifically" that his
objection was based on relevance.

On appeal, therefore, his

claims based on rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
are plainly preserved.
In contrast, defendant nowhere stated at trial that he was
objecting based on rules 408 and 410 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Nor did he argue the substance of those rules to the

trial court.4

Defendant thus failed to "give the trial court

notice of the very error" he now asserts on appeal.
P.2d at 460.

Tolman, 912

Because defendant failed to provide fair notice to

4

That is, defendant did not argue to the trial court that
his statement should be inadmissible because it was part of a
plea discussion or intended to be a compromise negotiation. See
Utah Rule of Evidence 408 and 410(4).
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the trial court that he intended to object to the admission of
the evidence based on rules 408 and 410, and because the trial
court never had the opportunity to consider these grounds for
objection, defendant's rule 408 and 410 arguments are not
preserved for appeal.5
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENT BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVANT
TO SHOW HIS CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT
Defendant argues that his statement inquiring about what
kind of a deal he could get was inadmissible because "[i]t did
not have any bearing <?n any element of the crimes charged, and it
did not make the fact that [he] otherwise denied the alleged
abuse more or less probable" (Br. of Aplt. at 8-9). Defendant's
relevance argument is premised on the notion that his statement
was made as part of a plea negotiation (Id. at 24-25).
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."

Utah R. Evid. 401. Here,

after waiving his Miranda rights, defendant uttered and then
5

Nor did defendant in his appellate brief assert either
plain error or exceptional circumstances as a way around the
waiver doctrine. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5
(Utah 1995)(where defendant failed to argue that plain error or
exceptional circumstances justified review of unpreserved issue,
appellate court declined to consider it).
11

repeated his query to the investigating detective several times,
all well before the State had identified, much less filed, any
criminal charges against him (R. 277: 169, 171, 207-08).

His sua

sponte statement, made only to an investigator well before any
charges were filed, was thus plainly not part of a "plea
negotiation," as defendant asserts.6
Under the circumstances here, defendant's inquiry about
"what kind of a deal he could get if he pled guilty" suggested
that he was thinking ahead to identify any advantages that might
accrue to him in exchange for an admission of guilt•

The

reasonable implication of his anxious statement is that he
thought he was guilty and was exploring ways to mitigate the
consequences of his conduct, if at all possible.

His statement

is thus relevant as circumstantial evidence of his consciousness
of guilt.7
Assuming that the statement was not relevant, defendant
further argues that its admission prejudiced him because "[t]his
case hinged on credibility" (Br. of Aplt. at 26).

He

characterizes the testimony of the two child victims as
6

Had defendant made his statement after charges had been
filed as part of a true plea negotiation with the prosecutor or
with someone expressly authorized to negotiate a plea, then
defendant's argument would certainly be far more palatable.
7

Notably, defendant does not argue on appeal that if the
evidence was relevant, its probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Utah R. Evid.
403.
12

"unsubstantiated and vague reports of abuse," speculating that
"[t]he jurors may have been searching for some reason beyond the
girls' testimony to believe that abuse occurred" (Id. at 27).
Absent his statement, defendant surmises that the jury would have
acquitted him (Id. at 28).
Even assuming arguendo that defendant's statement was not
relevant, excluding it would not have created a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable verdict for him.

The testimony of

the child victims was consistent with what each had told the
detective shortly after the mother notified the police and with
each other.

And contrary to defendant's repeated

characterization of their testimony as "vague," it was, in fact,
punctuated with numerous specific and telling details.

Many of

these details related to matters about which young children would
normally have no knowledge, absent personal experience.
For example, the younger child did not merely state, as
defendant implies, that he touched her in "the wrong place."
Br. of Aplt. at 26.

See

Rather, she specifically described the parts

of her body she was referring to (R. 277: 115-16).

She described

the details of how she came to see defendant's penis, what it
looked like, and how he made her touch it (Id. at 119-20).

She

described the lotion he made her rub on his penis, where he kept
it, and what color it was (Id. at 120-21).

She described the

physiological change in defendant's penis and described
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ejaculation (Id. at 120-21).

She described the difference,

depending on whether they were at home or in the truck, in how he
cleaned himself up afterwards (Id. at 121-22).
The older sister's testimony also detailed defendant's
touching, listing the various locations at which it occurred and
details of how defendant would touch her (Id, at 137-38, 152,
156).

She mentioned the lotion, described ejaculation, and

described defendant retrieving napkins from the glove box in his
truck to wipe himself off (Id. at 141) . She also stated that
defendant would sometimes buy her treats afterwards. (Id. at
152).

She testified that defendant told her "a lot of times" not

to tell or he would go to jail (Id. at 139).
Furthermore, the investigating detective corroborated that
the girls' testimony was substantially similar to what they had
related to her during her initial interview (Id. at 167).
Specifically, the detective stated that the in-court testimony of
the children was consistent with what they had told her regarding
trips to the store with defendant in his truck, the use of
lotion, wiping himself off with a napkin, where and how the
touching occurred at home, and where the mother was when it
happened (Id. at 167).
Finally, the record contains no evidence that the mother
influenced the children's testimony In any way.
no motive to do so.

Indeed, she had

Defendant was not the father of the
14

children, the mother was financially dependent on defendant, and
she would have had nothing at all to gain by trying to influence
their testimony (R. 277 at 93, 97, 107) . And the evidence is
undisputed that, after the initial revelation at the bus stop,
the mother did not question either girl further about defendant's
activities with them (IsL. at 98, 104, 126, 143).
Ultimately, of course, "determinations of witness
credibility are left to the jury.

The jury is free to believe or

disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony."

State v.

Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas,
793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1990)).

And,

[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)(citations
omitted).
Here, the evidence was essentially undisputed and, as was
well within its prerogative, the jury chose to believe the girls
and the investigating detective.

Although defendant's repeated

statement suggested a guilty consciousness, the State's case did
not rise or fall on it.

Considered in light of the girls'

consistent and persuasive testimony, even if the trial court had
15

excluded defendant's statement about what kind of a deal he could
get, the outcome of the trial would likely have been just the
same.

Consequently, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he

suffered harm by its admission.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child,
all first degree felonies.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J±_ day of November, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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